

SAFE HOUSE SOULS: Bodily Charged Souls Responding to Hasker's "Souls, Beastly, and Human."

Abstract: William Hasker in his article, "Souls, Beastly, and Human", raises a set of cluster-related objections to traditional or creationist-dualisms, as he calls them. He argues that these views are unappealing and arbitrary and that his emergentist variety of substance dualism fares better given the mind-brain relationship and evolutionary continuity. I offer some initial thoughts in response to his worries for what I call the standard creationist model. I find his objections unconvincing and put forward two alternative creationist-soul views that fits with an alternative metaphysical story of persons. I suggest two models. First, I suggest a kind of Divine conceptualism. Second, I suggest a view where bodies activate souls and souls are created in a kind of safe house awaiting activation. It seems that this view (or a view like it) does not fall prey to Hasker's objections, and such a view deserves further reflection from philosophers and theologians.

In a recent article, William Hasker raises several objections against creationist-dualism as unappealing and arbitrary (1) Furthermore, he suggests that emergent souls, as he construes them, are more appealing and account for the seeming continuity in the physical species and mind-on-brain dependence. I seek to respond to this recent set of related objections and put forward a creationist-dualist response. By way of preface, I am making certain assumptions about the nature of persons/souls, and I am not seeking to make a defense for the truthfulness of a traditional or creationist-dualism whereby souls or persons are simple not able to be generated in a physical like process. Instead, I am working with some presuppositions that many substance dualists maintain in contrast to Hasker's variation of emergent substance dualism (hereafter ESD) where souls are generated or emerge from the physical. With these assumptions in mind, I respond to Hasker's recent objection(s) or worries and suggest two alternative metaphysical stories of soul-creation satisfactorily account for the objections raised. In this way, only substance dualists interested in defending a more traditional, Cartesian (as a term of art), or creationist view would be sympathetic to the approach I am taking here.

Hasker's Objection to Creationist-Souls in "Souls Beastly and Human"

In several places, William Hasker raises problems for creationist substance dualism (hereafter CD) (2). What he means by this is that human persons are comprised of two concrete particulars or exist as souls that have bodies and interact with those bodies. Additionally, souls are simple or indivisible and require direct creation/causation by a Divine agent. Furthermore, he suggests that, as a part of the package deal, CD brings with it the notion that soul's are the life of the body, otherwise called vitalism. Problematically, Hasker seems to conflate vitalism with traditional dualism and Cartesian dualism. There is a problem with conflating these positions because they do not share the same features as a part of their core, which creates more confusion. Instead, these views really should be considered separately (3). Hasker argues that CD does not provide sufficient accounting for the fine-grained dependence of mind-on-brain, nor do they offer a view whereby humans are sufficiently continuous with animals.

In a recent article in *The Soul Hypothesis*, Hasker has put forward a unique objection to traditional varieties of substance dualism that require creationism, and he suggests, once again, that his view better accommodates human-animal continuity and mind-on-brain dependence. However, I am not convinced either (i) that his objection(s) succeeds or (ii) that ESD is much better off concerning the two data listed above. First, after laying out Hasker's objection(s), I offer an initial assessment of his article and suggest that standard creationism does not fall prey to most of Hasker's concerns. Added to this, ESD has some problems of its own which deserve some explanation. Second, I put forward two variations of creationist-dualism that offer the philosopher/theologian resources that may better accommodate Hasker's concerns. Hasker's desiderata for a satisfying anthropological position seems to include the following four ideas:

1. Fine-grained dependence of mind on brain (the union problem)

2. Evolutionary continuity between species
3. A non ad-hoc explanation for a soul becoming embodied
4. Avoidance of arbitrary line drawing in terms of animals and humans

As I see it, the creationist can account for or provide a response to the above desiderata in one way or another.

William Hasker's Critique

Hasker begins his critique of CD in the context of discussing polyps in biological evolution where he assumes that polyps have or are souls (4). One might think that polyps in fact do have souls given they have life (i.e. organic life, traditionally wherein vitalism attributed life to a soul) and are continuous with higher-level organisms in a consistent picture of physical evolution. In terms of polyps, while the polyps and the story surrounding them might be a helpful analogy or illustration to start off a discussion, my concern has more to do with his objection against CD as it pertains to human persons (5). Hasker has stated, "The standard view concerning the origin of such souls is that they are individually created by God – but it is unappealing, to say the least, to suppose that God is standing by, ready with a fresh supply of souls, each time Reaumur does this polyp-chopping!" (6) This would seem to be unappealing and might suggest that there is an excess of souls. Below, I refer to Hasker's portrayal of creationist-dualism as the standard account (hereafter SCD).

Hasker's drawing from the polyps as an analogy is unhelpful because using polyps as an analogy for human souls in the biological story creates more confusion than is necessary. I realize Hasker is using polyps to lay out the multi-faceted and fluid issues involved in biological evolution, but in the short space that he writes he unnecessarily conflates (as I mentioned above) issues that need addressing on an individual basis. Coupled with this, he

begins discussing souls in light of vitalism and moves to discussing traditional and/or creationist dualism for the purposes of criticizing CD. However, in the process, it becomes confusing, to say the least, to conflate Cartesian views with other variants of creationist substance dualism. Cartesian dualisms would certainly not fit with vitalist conceptions of persons. In the end, Hasker's discussion unnecessarily complicates the issue making it difficult to tease out and distinguish all the issues involved.

Hasker purports that defenders of CD have difficulty with line drawing. Hasker states in the context of discussing Descartes on souls, "A somewhat less objectionable strategy is to assign souls to animals as well as to human beings, but to limit them to "higher" animals, those for which we have convincing behavioral evidence that they do experience sensation if not actual thought." He proceeds to ask the question, "One question raised by this proposal is, where should we draw the line?" (7) His solution is a third way for understanding the mind/soul body relationship and how organisms (including humans) situate in evolution, namely, ESD where conscious or soul-stuff exists potentially in matter. However, most substance dualists are not willing to grant that souls emerge from brains, and find this too difficult to swallow. Before offering two alternative metaphysical stories in line with CD, I have some initial concerns about Hasker's objection to SCD.

Initial Concerns with Hasker's Paper

Hasker, as stated above, argues that CD requires the odd consequence that God has a set of souls on standby ready for attachment to a body. But, I wonder, why should a defender of CD grant such an oddity. It seems plausible to conceive of a state of affairs whereby God can create the appropriate number of souls that correspond with particular bodies successively generated through biological evolution. God simply creates souls for bodies.

Another related problem concerns the problem of embodiment. How does this soul become embodied in one particular body? If it is the case that souls do not supervene or emerge from the brain or the various parts of the body, then, on the surface, it is difficult to ascertain how souls become embodied or assume a body. If one were to add to this the intuition from the possibility of body-swapping, then it would follow that this would further buttress the non-intuitive nature of soul embodiment. To which a defender of SCD should respond by saying, “this situation depends solely upon Divine design.” Hasker raises an additional worry concerning SCD as simple and non-spatial (yet, this is a debatable assumption even among those who more closely align with Cartesianism), which he claims makes it difficult to conceive of how a soul interacts with one body (8). There are two ways to address this problem. One is to affirm that souls are spatial, and, two, is to say that the soul’s capacities and powers can concentrate on a particular spatial location (9). Neither of these assumptions seem like an overwhelming problem for SCD. Having said this, it may be that ESD is in a slightly better position in that it provides an *emergent* relation for body-soul interaction, but it comes at the cost of affirming the mysterious proposition that physicality produces souls. A related problem from this mysterious emergence carries even greater weight.

Whilst the defender of SCD has difficulty determining the how of embodiment, Hasker’s emergent soul encounters an even greater problem from his *mysterian* assumptions about mentality (10). How is it that *this* body gives rise to *this* soul? It is not clear that it does, nor is it clear that a particular body would ever give rise to a particular soul or any soul. In fact, it is conceivable that brains would not give rise to a particular soul. What is it about this brain that gives rise to me instead of Hugh Jackman? There is nothing respective of a particular brain that would suggest that it would give rise to me rather than Hugh Jackman. At

least, there is nothing as far as I can tell. This, then, seems a much greater problem for ESD than Hasker's concerns with SCD. Thus, the two are not on equal footing concerning embodiment.

As for Hasker's objection from arbitrary line drawing, I would suggest that Hasker's ESD is not much better off than SCD. The problem for ESD is that the defender must draw the line somewhere, which on Hasker's metaphysical story will appear to be arbitrary and ad-hoc. For example, it becomes a bit ridiculous to claim that flies or mosquitos too have souls. If in fact we characterize souls as unique among the physical world, then to attribute souls or consciousness at such a low-level would seem to undermine the unique nature of souls. Having said this, I am not aware of any dualist who affirms that humans have souls but higher-level animals do not have souls or mental properties, which is something Hasker mentions with respect to Cartesians. So, the question for the defender of SCD is where does one draw the line? At one level, I am not sure how to answer this question, but I am not sure that Hasker's solution has a simple answer either. Thus, it is not entirely clear that Hasker's ESD fares much better.

As I see it, the only virtue of Hasker's ESD that SCD might not share is its *neatness* in the sense that it provides a coherent explanation of the empirical data when that physical data is taken as fundamental to the story of humans (11). Yet, affirming ESD comes with the cost of undermining the uniqueness of souls and positing that *soma* can produce souls. This is a cost that I, along with other defenders of CD, am not willing to accept.

I will try to be as charitable as possible to Hasker, so let me offer two other metaphysical stories that might prove more promising than SCD. The first is what I call Divine-conceptualism, which I suggest is still creationist but offers the philosopher resources for constructing a *neat* and *continuous* story of created embodied souls or ensouled bodies.

Minimally, the story is distinct from Hasker's stereotypical creationist story (what you might call the standard model) and is less ad-hoc in terms of *how* the soul comes to be embodied. Second, I advance a modified creationist view that motivates a more natural view of the soul's relationship to a body in biological evolution—a distinct weakness of SCD, according to Hasker.

Divine Conceptions of Souls and the World

One might think of the soul's relationship to the physical world in terms of Divine conceptualism. Divine conceptualism is a term often referring to God's relationship to abstract objects. On this view God has direct knowledge of abstract objects like numbers, colors, and other multiply-exemplifiable objects. These abstract objects are said to depend upon the mind of God. In the context here, I suggest that God holds in his mind a concept of each individual person (not necessarily the actually existent person) that will come to exist in the physical world. Such that, he has a concept of Sally and Sammy who both come into existence in 1992 for example. With Divine conceptualism of souls, one is able to motivate a different story, in keeping with CD, than the one posited by Hasker.

It seems we can offer a more continuous and appealing story of soul-origins in terms of Divine conceptualism. God creates the world with an embedded order that occurs in natural succession. In this Divine act, God designs the world to unfold according to physical evolution whereby his creative act has effects that unfold in time. In this way, there is a sense in which the sensible/physical world is already dependent upon something more fundamental, namely the Divine mind, which undermines the problems that emerge according to Hasker for substance dualism. Concerning humans, God designs the world in such a fashion that bodies are generated through physical processes from the time the gametes meet - after a sufficiently

complex level of evolutionary development (12). Yet, at this point in the story, it is not clear where souls exist.

On CD, a common assumption is made that there is a gap between the somatic part and the soul's coming to act in the physical world. In fact, the two are sufficiently distinct such that soma could not give rise to and produce souls, as we have with Hasker's ESD. However, one could affirm a picture whereby souls come into existence with their somatic parts continuous with physical evolution. Consider the following, God creates the world as one Divine act and with that Divine act he creates souls to exist as discrete effects in time. This means they exist concretely when they are united with their somatic parts at physical conception or at some later time. During the interim, these souls depend upon the mind of God. Wherein, God has a blueprint of the world in his mind from beginning to end. In this blueprint, God designs the world with the emergence of souls with bodies. One could think of this like the information on a disk that is uploaded to the server of the computer. Such that when the corresponding somatic part (i.e. the body/brain) comes to exist so does the soul with it. Given God's design of the world and the fact that he has a blueprint that corresponds to actual events in the world, he can at the moment of the somatic part's existence upload the soul. And, this would not require his doing an additional act from the one Divinely created act, but, instead, it is pre-determined to correspond with the states of affairs in the world (13). In this way, the idea or the concept of the soul depends on the mind of God like an abstract object only to become actual in relation to its somatic part that exists in time.

The Divine conceptualist metaphysical story excludes the idea of God having a supply of souls on reserve coming down the conveyor belt (14). Additionally, it excludes the possibility of excess souls because God has designed the world with a set number of human bodies that correspond to and require souls (that originally depend upon the mind of God).

One could also affirm the notion that souls exist continuous with physical evolution not by physical law but by an intentional design that is pre-determined along with the states of affairs in the physical world. Now, depending upon one's assumptions about the Divine mind in relation to future contingents, this would require the rejection of an *open* universe (15).

Finally, how does this picture square with mind on brain dependence? It appears that there is no obvious or intuitive relation between the soul and the brain. Hasker may perceive this to be a weakness of the Divine conceptual view of souls and the world. By way of response, God could design souls that require the bodily structure for functional implementation. Ultimately, this would seem to depend upon Divine design (16). In the end, Hasker may see this as a liability of the hypothesis. However, the defender of CD sees this as a virtue given that it serves as a 'sign' or a 'pointer' to a personal cause of the universe full of souls and as a metaphysical explanation of souls (17). The defender of CD can say along with John Foster that this provides the dualist with a persuasive argument for the existence of God (18).

At this point the reader may wonder how this is distinct from SCD, and it may not be in the sense that it is still *creationist*. The difference is in *how* God brings about souls that are continuous with biological evolution. According to Hasker's understanding of creationism, God has a supply of souls on standby that he inserts into a body at the appropriate physical development of the human organism. On the surface this does appear ad-hoc and may leave open the possibility that some bodies may not be ensouled and some souls embodied, but I am not sure that it necessitates this picture (unless we live in an open universe). Certainly on the story provided here it does not, given that God has arranged successively generated bodies with corresponding souls. My only intent is to provide a more comprehensive story that is consistent with creationism and gives us a different picture of God's dealings with the world.

The strongest charge Hasker could lay at the feet of CD, according to this standard conception, is that God is responsive to worldly affairs rather than the other way around. On the Divine conceptualist creationist view that I advance, it is conceivable that contingent occurrences like souls uniting to bodies are part of the design plan and come about in a continuous manner. As such, the defender of creationism can paint a picture that is quite contrary to Hasker's ad-hoc portrayal of the creationist view. Additionally, CD can, with a little legwork, avert the problem of excess souls or non-ensouled bodies. What seems more challenging for CD is providing a natural or intuitive relation between the body and soul, which may be the weakness of CD in general and the strength of ESD. Hasker's view, though, comes with a built-in cost – once again. Having said this, if Hasker remains unconvinced or unsatisfied with such a view, then there is an alternative CD worth considering.

Bodily Charged Souls (Activational Dualism)

My interest is in developing a view of CD that is able to account for mind-brain dependence, animal-human continuity, and allows for an alternative metaphysical story of origins (19). In what follows, I advance a second story that includes the notion of activated soul-body units, which come into existence at some time awaiting activation. Initially, I wish to motivate a picture of souls as activational because this serves as part of the story where souls exist in a kind of safe-house awaiting activation. Activational CD of this sort says that the body and soul have properties that are only actualized in relation to the other part, and the soul in some sense intimately depends upon the soma for functional living.

Like Hasker's ESD, the soul is a substance in its own right bearing causal powers and properties respective of the particular immaterial/mental substance. In this way, the soul really is distinct from the brain, the nervous system, and the body. Having said that, the

emergent soul, on Hasker's articulation, is causally produced by the brain and sustained by that brain. Similarly, I suggest that activational dualism bears similar characteristics with ESD's soul, but this does not require that one take the leap in accepting that materiality somehow gives rise to a soul. Instead, one could affirm something more modest whereby the soul is functionally dependent upon the brain, yet not produced by it. As such the soul's powers (or many of the soul's powers) are properly speaking powers of the soul not of the body as with ESD, but require some kind of activation and causal sustenance from the brain.

One could view souls as largely inactive without their corresponding bodies. This situation would be that the bodies and brains of souls activate souls and, in some sense, contribute to the soul's nature (i.e., properties or powers) and functioning. Souls then would have an intimate dependence on their bodies and a teleological relationship that establishes and situates the soul in a context of flourishing. This may not be true of all souls (i.e. God and angels), but if we assume human beings are essentially souls of a different type then we can offer a differing metaphysical picture of humans than the one Hasker advances. At this point, the reader might request a description of what it is to be a soul. I would suggest that a soul is the substance that has the powers of thinking and volition and is the center of mental activity. Call the view described here as activational CD.

A bodily charged view of souls has resources that satisfy Hasker's concerns. First, it has the resources to account for fine-grained mind-on-brain dependence. The soul just does require the brain to function properly. Somewhat speculatively, the soul requires the brain to gain specified sensual powers that it otherwise would not have apart from the brain in virtue of the overlapping teleological properties shared by the brain and soul. Call these teleo-functional properties. If we take it that all human souls naturally exist in a compound structure (i.e. body and soul), then we can motivate a picture that begins to look like Hasker's

ESD, yet remains creationist. It seems this would go some way in accounting for a more fine-grained dependence of mind on brain. More than this, the soul requires the soma's (and neuronal) activation of the soul's other functional properties, namely volitional and mental actings (20).

In order to parse this out more clearly, we could think of different types of competing souls. One could take a relational or generic soul to be a pure soul that has no intrinsic relationship to bodies, yet these souls can adapt and become interactive with a hunk of matter. In this way, souls only become human in relation to bodies. Alternatively, one could affirm a kind soul whereby souls have an intrinsic property of humanness and have an essential relation to bodies. Finally, one could affirm another variant of kind souls by saying that the soul is a pure soul that has an intrinsic human property (even if apart from the body), but bears a first-order property to a body that is only actualized, as a second-order property, when the soul is embodied. On the compound view of substance dualism here, I suggest we affirm a variant of a kind view of souls. This can be fleshed out more fully in terms of teleo-functional properties.

Teleo-functional properties are those properties, I suggest, that are internal to the soul and are dispositional in nature. Without the body/brain in place, the soul would not function properly and specific functions naturally attributable to the human soul would lay dormant. It is important to emphasize, at this point, that this is not a form of hylomorphism given that the soul is not the form of the body and that persons are not literally comprised of both body and soul. Yet it does share some important elements with it because the soul requires the soma to function. The functionality of the soul requires implementation in the body. The intimacy of such dependence really does seem apparent to our first-person experiences. The nature of the body's powers by degree enhances or weakens the capacities of the soul.

Experience seems to corroborate and correspond with the notion that souls have intrinsic structure and bear a uniting relation to somatic parts. This notion that the soul has a teleological-structure that corresponds to a body or fits with a body finds support in our experience. When I attempt to undertake an action, it takes varying levels of effort. It may be that I have libertarian or contra-causal freedom, but this does not preclude the notion that some choices are more difficult than other choices (21). Take for example the life of a runner. A runner's body is fit for running while a non-runner is not fit for running. While both the runner and the non-runner has the opportunity to run, it does not mean that both experience the same level of ease when it comes to running. The runner's decision to run on one day will be much easier than it is for the non-runners choice to run. Yet both the runner and the non-runner have the volitional capacity to do so, yet not to the same degree. Whilst the soul may exist and its powers may exist, they may only be functional corresponding to the level of the soul's bodily habits. This suggests not that the soul is the body, but that there is an intimate and strong kind of dependence the soul has on the body.

The critic of activational CD may respond by claiming that this provides no further explanation than saying that God makes it so, but this would miss the point. In fact, human souls are not generic but have a kind-nature property whereby they are functionally dependent upon the somatic part. If the objector wishes to press this objection further, then it seems that s(he) would need to say the same about ESD. At some level, Hasker's ESD lacks a sufficient explanation because of his mysterian assumptions about physicality. Arguably, activational CD provides an advantage over SCD in that it posits a more *natural* soul-body relationship.

Furthermore, this does not exclude the possibility of the soul's existence disembodied, but it makes it unnatural because the soul bears a kind-nature property to a body and flourishes in its interactions with the body, but it still retains its independence from the body.

It may be that souls function in a much-diminished state without their bodies or that the soul's functioning ceases completely, but the soul does not cease to exist. Once again, Hasker's ESD is not in a stronger position concerning disembodied existence because it would appear that souls would cease to exist when the brain ceases (22). Maximally, activational CD would require some additional help to sustain the soul's functionality. The objector might think that if the soul depends in this deep way on the body that it would cease after somatic death, but this does not follow. Souls could still have a modal distinction allowing for separation. If the soul is construed as a part of a larger substance or mereological compound that it has teleological relationships to, then it is natural to assume that the individual soul comes to exist with the bodily/brain aggregate that it depends upon (hence a helpful distinction between kinds of souls that are un-embodied and kinds of souls that potentially exist disembodied) (23).

In contrast to the common analogy of the magnet used by Hasker, I suggest another analogy that could help motivate a slightly different picture of the soul-body relationship. We could think of the soul's relationship in terms of the haemoglobin (24). You might say this iron-containing protein becomes functionally active in the blood, yet it has the potentiality to exist on its own. While in the blood it has the function of binding and releasing oxygen in the blood. Additionally, Eleanore Stump's analogy of the enzyme seems to apply here (25). Where the enzyme exists with activating sites for the substrate to fit, this, then, creates a complex bind and a dynamic configurational state. In this way, there is no permanent chemical change to the enzyme. In the same way, souls and bodies remain distinct yet have a sort of fittingness for the other. Herein, the somatic part, specifically the brain, becomes a receptacle for the soul. The fear is that this illustration yields hylomorphism more than compound dualism, but I am not sure it does. What it excludes is a pure substance dualism

with relational souls where these souls have no structure, no internal property or aptness for bodies, and, only, come to interactively function with a body.

Given this is the case, it is important to point out how activational CD would account for the data of animal and human continuity. Hasker raises the objection that CD creates problems for the biological evidence on animal and human similarities. The empirical data seems to suggest that animals and humans bear neural and physiological similarities, which would seem to count against CD. However, I am not sure that it does. The defender of activational CD can affirm physical continuity and similarities between the souls of humans and animals in terms of their functional properties. Beyond this, I am not sure what else Hasker would want. Having said this, I suggest that activational CD comes closer to ESD and provides an accounting for the empirical data without the need to reject soul-creation. The important difference between ESD and activational CD is the notion of the soul's being produced by the somatic part in contrast to the somatic part activating and providing a base for the soul. Activational CD supplies a ground for the empirical data without going beyond the empirical data to posit an emergent-soul producing *mechanism*.

As a result, Activational CD has some affinities to Hasker's ESD. Activational CD of this sort or some similar view has several benefits that are worth summarizing here. First, it has the resources to offer a cogent and comprehensive story of how souls are united (see below for more elaboration). Second, a defender of this view can affirm a sufficiently dualistic view of human nature without muddying the waters as could be argued concerning hylomorphism or Hasker's emergentism. Third, defenders of this variation of CD can offer an account that works more naturally with evolutionary theory and mind-on-brain-dependence given that souls have teleological relations to their bodies and functionally depend on bodies. Fourth, Activational CD offers a natural/intuitive accounting or story for the union of body

and soul. Specifically, the view I put forward has the advantage of uniting soul and body without the necessity of affirming Hasker's dualism with materialist origins. Furthermore, it seems to me, one can offer an alternative metaphysical story to the 'unappealing' creationist story suggested by Hasker. To this we turn.

Alternative Metaphysical Story: A Safe House of Souls

An alternative metaphysics of creation that has similar benefits to the Thomistic view is a view that affirms that souls exist at the beginning of the physical creation in a kind of safe house (26). This view is different from the Thomistic metaphysic of soul-creation in that it does not require the questionable metaphysics of secondary causes or transcendent agency (27). Additionally, a metaphysical story of origins on this view differs in important respects from Hasker's view. Instead of physicality bearing the potentiality to produce a soul, souls exist as a particular(s) in a place or they exist in a non-spatial kind of existence tied to a larger compound structure. A metaphysical story might be told whereby God creates souls at the beginning of the created natural order and souls are in a safe house ready to con-join with, depend upon, and interact with the corresponding neural and somatic part that God has designed it for. In this way, God pre-loads the barrel of the gun. Given the nature of souls and bodies according to activational CD, souls could unite with bodies and function in a law-like manner (28). In virtue of the soul's bearing properties that are exclusive of the body it cannot be that the brain causes the existence of the soul, but it could activate it. And, it can provide a more natural and intuitive union between soul and brain (e.g., than SCD according to Hasker) because the soul is designed for a soma, depends upon the soma, and is activated by a particular neural structure (29). Hypothetically, God creates the soul for a particular kind of

body such that the soul functions in tandem with the soma, and depends upon that soma. The most immediate question that emerges pertains to the location of souls.

I suggest, hypothetically, that the most natural place to begin is with the first human being or the first couple (One could affirm Adam as metaphysical placeholder for the first human without actually believing in a literal Adam) (30). Assuming there is a first human being (or a population of human beings), it is natural to affirm that this human is the progenitor of other individual human beings. In this way, we could affirm that the world is one Divinely created act at the beginning that unfolds according to Divine design. These temporal effects are predicated upon one Divine act that occur in natural succession. Souls actualize or concretize at a particular time according to a particular place in space. Originally, they exist dependent upon the mind of Adam later to become actualized at a particular event in time. Taking a page from Berkeley's metaphysical idealism, we could think of these souls as dependent upon the mind of Adam. Where Berkeley affirms that human souls are Divine ideas or dependent upon the Divine mind in some robust sense, we could affirm something like this wherein God creates souls that exist in a sort of safehouse that transfer and upon transfer to a human body the soul becomes actualized. In this way, we would have something like a dualism of 'subject' and 'idea' whereby the first subject carries along all the souls that will activate at a particular time. Succeeding 'subjects' are like ideas in that they are dependent upon a mind until they become embodied. These ideas would be dependent upon Adam like the steel beams of a building are supported by the concrete foundation. In this way they are not necessarily proper parts of Adam, only loosely are they parts for an interim period.

The following is one way to parse out the story of how souls transition from a safe-house to a particular body. God creates one soul, the Adamic-soul, which supports

undifferentiated parts or differentiated parts. Once again, souls are indivisible and cannot be divided (i.e., as parturient variations) or split-off, as one would have with traducian-souls (31). Instead, Adam bears a supporting relation and an enclosed relation for other souls. The soul-parts can be individualized in terms of their teleological relations to a particular somatic part. As the story goes, a somatic part comes into existence, then the appropriate soul-part attaches to its corresponding part through an attractive force (32). Similar to notions of emergence and supervenience, given above, the soul-part depends in important ways on the soma for the actualization of its nature. The soul-part in relation to its corresponding somatic-part causally issues new properties that complete the nature of the individualized human soul. This would be a form of property-nature emergence, namely the idea that certain dispositional properties emerge when the body and soul interact and unite as one unit. Whilst it is similar to traducianism in that one soul is created that is able to bring about new souls as parts or fissile souls, this view does not contain the notion of parturient or fissile souls. It seems that all souls (e.g., soul-parts) are synchronically related not diachronically related (e.g., traducianism) because God creates all the souls at once (33). It may seem strange in that souls are not parturient or fissile (although this might be an interesting alternative to the one I am suggesting). Souls transfer in the sense that their powers become actual in the respective physical part that they come in contact. Such that souls transfer in the sense that body's activate the powers of the souls. In this way, soul's would then gain 'ownership' of the particular body.

However, one worry a defender of activational CD and safe house souls might have is over pre-existence. The metaphysical story of CD I advance here seems to require a kind of pre-existence, yet it is important to note that this view does not require a pre-existence view in the spirit or tradition of Origen. This view is neither Origenistic or pseudo-Origenistic in

nature (34). Where Origen posited that souls exist in an eternal state and/or in a heavenly state that come to be embodied at the fall, Activational CD does not suggest a story of pre-existence of this kind. The pre-existence, once again, is different from Hasker's view that potential souls pre-exist in the material. The kind of pre-existence on creationist-dualism is the notion that souls exist not in the material but dependent upon an immaterial substance, or as an immaterial substance in a holding place. Furthermore, the pre-existent soul is pre-determined such that each soul is determined to exist and function with a particular soma.

One might think at this point that there would be no difference between a pre-existing soul and a soul existing after somatic death. Furthermore, this suggests that the somatic part has two positive roles. First, it has the role of activating the soul's powers and functionality. This seems natural if we assume that the soul is a concrete part that intimately depends upon soma to function. It is a like a car engine that continues to function for a short period after the ignition is turned off. Granted this illustration is limited, the engine does exist in some sense but it requires activation by the ignition, and the running of the motor will persist in a weakened state after the ignition ceases even though the ignition originally activates the motor of the engine. Second, the somatic part or the event surrounding the soma's existence may have some role to play in the individuation of the soul (in a first-order manner or second-order manner). This, then, avoids one odd consequence for SCD put forward by Hasker.

Having said this, I do think we can offer a hypothesis on how it is that a soul could come to be embodied. If a soul, by design, is activated by a somatic part then we could conceive of a somatic part picking (metaphorically speaking) a soul at random (35). Souls dependent upon brains, beginning with Adam, are like objects carried along a conveyor belt

and picked out by a magnet (in contrast to the magnet producing a magnetic field as is common with Hasker's ESD) (36). In this case, the new brain, which emerges from procreation, acts like a magnet that activates the powers of the soul. The magnet acts like the brain/body that creates an attractive force when it comes in close proximity with the soul's teleo-functional properties and powers (something like psychic energy that concentrates around a spatial location). On this view, souls are carried along by brains. Furthermore, somatic parts are generated (similar to traducianism) and once that generation occurs souls are transferred from one brain to a distinct compound structure.

The objector may retort and argue that there still could be a possibility that some souls never actually become embodied because of the randomness of souls becoming embodied (37). However, it seems that if human souls functionally depend on brains in conjunction with the notion of Divine design, then this will not be. When God creates the world, including souls, it does not seem conceivable that God would create an excess of souls that never come to exist embodied. Why should one think God would create additional human souls that never actualize in relation to bodies? In fact, human souls just are the kinds of souls that are embodied. As to the specific human somatic part, there is a kind of necessity that souls exist embodied. Given what I develop above, the nature of human souls have an internal potency for particular kinds of bodies, even if those same human souls bear the potentiality to exist disembodied.

An additional worry may come into view. The objector could raise the problem of **vagueness** concerning the point in time when the soul would be activated by a body, but I would suggest that this is not unique to activational CD or other variants of CD. In fact the problem of vagueness occurs for ESD when considering the time when the neural part produces a human soul. The defender of activational CD can tell a story whereby the soul

functionally depends upon the human body at the moment of conception. All that is needed is a sufficiently distinct body, and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that at the moment of conception we have a substance with active powers and passive liabilities. If this is the case, then there is a matter of fact to the situation even if the powers of the human body/brain are not fully developed. A state of the matter is primary to the degreed qualities it comes to bear.

A final worry might be that the solution is unnecessarily ad-hoc or is an arbitrarily concocted story, but I am not sure that it is ad-hoc. If the soul bears a kind-nature, then it appears just as plausible as Hasker's ESD. At one level all explanations will seem ad-hoc to some degree, but if the soul bears certain properties in conjunction with a body then it is conceivable that certain law-like regularities would follow from the interaction of the two parts, which would then provide a ground for making sense of embodied souls in biological evolution. If the worry is that there are too many factors and Hasker's ESD is a simpler theory, then this may be true but it would require further argumentation than what Hasker advocates in "Souls, Beastly, and Human." My question, then, is, why not tell this sort of story? It is unclear in both Hasker's piece and the broader literature on substance dualism why one could not tell a story of activational CD with safe house souls in contrast to SCD. If one were to offer up reasons why a defender of CD with kind-nature souls could not tell this kind of story, then my sneaking suspicion would be that this person thinks she knows more than she really does. But, unless a response is forthcoming we will remain uncertain as to the merits of this worry.

Conclusion

In this short article, my aim was to respond to Hasker's objection(s) to creationist-dualism, which he develops in his recent article, "Souls Beastly and Human." My

attempt was neither to provide a definitive defense in favor of creationist-dualism nor to suggest that it would account for the empirical data as well as Hasker's emergent dualism. These issues deserve further exploration amongst philosophers and theologians. Instead, I advanced several initial responses to Hasker's article, and proposed two creationist-dualism stories that appear more satisfying given Hasker's desiderata mentioned above. Whilst these stories deserve further development, my goal was simply to motivate a different picture of God's creation of souls. In the end, I am not sure that Hasker's emergent dualism fares much better than creationist-dualism where souls are hidden in a safe house waiting to be revealed by their bodies.

Endnotes

1. See William Hasker, "Souls, Beastly and Human," in *The Soul Hypothesis*. Ed. By Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz (New York and London: Continuum, 2011). Hasker seems to take creationist dualism as synonymous with traditional. Additionally, Hasker actually uses the term 'unappealing'.
2. Most notably, see William Hasker in *The Emergent Self* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
3. See, "Souls, Beastly, and Human," pp. 202-203 and 21. Hasker appears to conflate these views. However, I do not know of a substance dualist who affirms vitalism nor do I see this as part of the core for affirming a creationist-soul view.
4. Polyps and the implications following the polyp discovery are famously attributed to Trembley. See Aram Vartanian, "Trembley's Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism," in Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland (eds), *Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 497-516.
5. According to Hasker, he sees polyps along with other organisms as continuous with the nature of human beings.
6. See *Souls Beastly and Human*, 209. Hasker seems to think there is good reason to think that polyps do have souls, which challenges a creationist-dualist view of the physical world. The metaphysical story offered by Hasker is interesting and I could see how one might construe soul-creation in this way, but it is not clear that defenders of soul-creation should have this picture in their minds. Reamor is a famous scientist who experimented on polyps.
7. *Ibid.* 209.
8. William Hasker, "Souls Beastly and Human" in *The Soul Hypothesis* (London: Continuum Publishing, 2011), 209.
9. Richard Swinburne has an interesting way of defining the soul's spatiality in *Mind, Brain, and Free Will*, 173. Swinburne says, "A non-physical substance does not 'occupy' space in the sense of filling it and excluding other things; and so if we wish to say that it has location we need to define the sense in which it has location. If it interacts with the physical world, it is natural to define it as being located in the place where it interacts with that world... It therefore seems natural to think of ourselves, and so our souls, the essential part of ourselves, as located in that part of the physical world of which we are most

- directly aware and which we can influence most directly. The soul of a human living on earth is located (in one sense) in that human's brain and (in another sense) in the whole of that human's body."
10. See William Hasker, *The Emergent Self*, 202.
 11. Wherein many today believe this is a safe assumption given the successes of the physical sciences, some would argue that we ought to make this assumption.
 12. Arguably, we have a substance present at conception.
 13. I would suggest that the affairs of evolution are unfolding out of the mind of God such that souls coming to exist could bear the feature of continuity. Minimally, this metaphysical story bears the feature of Divine action being **dynamic** and **fluid** with the physical processes. One could take this story in the direction of Idealism (where souls are ideas and attenuated substances) or could construe the world as a 4D object, but this is not required to tell a coherent story.
 14. Once again see Hasker, "Souls, Beastly, and Human", 209.
 15. For Hasker's theory to stick one would need to assume an 'open' view of the future. Without this assumption, the creationist need not grant the ad-hoc and unappealing story given by Hasker.
 16. The objector may still respond and say this provides no more explanation than simply saying that God made it that way. However, at some level, Hasker's view requires the same move because he does not provide a thorough explanation for soul emergence—given his mystertian assumptions about physicality.
 17. Here without spelling it out, I am assuming something like Thomas Reid's signs that serves as pointers that one can comprehend through basic sensory perceptions.
 18. See John Foster, "A Brief Defence of the Cartesian View," in *Soul, Body, and Survival: The Metaphysics of Human Persons* ed. By Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 29. Swinburne, also, develops a similar argument in his *The Existence of God* (Oxford: OUP, 2004), chapter 9. Both Foster and Swinburne affirm soul-creation.
 19. See Richard Swinburne in *Mind, Brain, and Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 172-173. Also see Swinburne in *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), see especially chapter 10. Swinburne may be a proponent of this view or something like it because of his view that the soul depends on the brain for functioning, derives character states from the body, and is naturally expressed in the body. However, he does not put forward a developed theory concerning the mind on brain dependence relation nor does he extrapolate what some of the implications might be for the origin of human beings.
 20. It seems to me something like this is developed in Robert Koons' work *Realism Regained* (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 16.2. Here Koons uses the term teleo-functions to refer to higher-order causal properties. As I see it, though, there is such a thing at its base that is immaterial that is realized and actualized with its material aggregate. Koons offers further explanation that is similar to what I suggest here, "Mental types are identified neither with physical types (not even infinitely complex disjunctions of physical types) nor with some super-physical, first-order property (as in classical Cartesianism), but with types involving higher-order causation." I would suggest that a mental property of a first-order sort brings about the higher-order causation in relation to the bodily aggregate.
 21. I became aware of this sort of argument by Frank C. Dilley in "Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defence of Cartesian Dualism." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jun., 2004), 149.
 22. See Hasker, *The Emergent Self*, see chapter 8. Hasker actually affirms that the neural part not only produces the soul but "characteristically" sustains it in existence. Characteristically is a key word because Hasker does not offer a definitive answer on whether or not the soul could exist with the sustaining brain. It does not follow, on his view, that the soul does not have some kind of causal independence from the body—it does—instead it has powers to act distinct from the physical part. See *The Emergent Self*, p. 193. Also see *Souls, Beastly and Human*, p. 215. Here Hasker says the soul finds its origin and continuance on the brain. However, in another place, Hasker makes it clear that he is offering a general description of the way things normally are not a definition such that the brain may not be necessary and essential for the soul's persistence. This question is left open. See William Hasker, "Hasker on the Banks of the Styx: A Reply to Glenn Andrew Peoples," in *Philosophia Christi* vol. 11 no. 1 (2009), 199.
 23. It may be that this could be fleshed out in terms of a loose supervenience relationship between souls and their bodies, something like a functional supervenience whereby teleo-functional properties manifest in relation to the body.
 24. XXXXX suggested this.
 25. See Eleanore Stump, *Aquinas* (London and New York: Routledge Press, 2003), chapter 6.

26. Where this safe house is or whether or not is spatial is not my concern, but it is conceivable that something like this could occur where souls exist in a place or structurally tied to some larger compound structure. XXXXX has stated in personal conversation that the only problem he sees with a view like this is that God must have exhaustive foreknowledge whether this be simple foreknowledge, Molinism, or compatibilist Determinism. This view would not necessarily require a traditional view of physical laws whereby there really are no mechanically determined laws in physical system only powers attributable to objects, although it could easily work with this view of laws. It is conceivable that one hold to physical mechanistically determined laws that usher in the functionally active soul and a complete human substance. However, these laws are still dependent upon Divine arbitration at some foundational level. This may seem ad-hoc and arbitrary, but a theist should say, "so what?" At one level, all explanations might seem this way to some.
27. I am thinking of Kathryn Tanner's development in *God and Creation in Christian Theology*, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005).
28. In personal conversation, XXXXX mentioned a thought experiment that could help motivate this view or some similar view. He spoke of psychic energy such that God could have created, yet now that the neural structure reaches a specified level of complexity, that psychic energy concentrates around the neural structure. This seems interesting and helpful to the story I put forward here. However, this would seem to require soul or mind-stuffs. I would suggest that something similar could occur with soul's that are bare particulars that have intrinsic potency or powers in relation to the appropriate neural structure. It could be that now the neural part becomes a distinct entity that it activates the causal powers of the soul it is related to. Such that, the soul's powers concretize around the neural arrangement. Richard Swinburne confirmed something like this in personal conversation as having emergentist elements and creationist-dualist elements. It still requires a direct creation of souls by God and the intentional design of God for this particular neural arrangement as connected with this particular soul.
29. XXXXX has stated that this would be something whereby the body supplied extra powers and properties to the soul thereby completing the nature of the soul and ushering in a more continuous view of physical organisms with souls. Additionally, a particular body would have the disposition to enact a particular soul that God gave the teleology for the soul to unite with body.
30. This does raise the question of where souls reside prior to Adam. Given this, one may need to affirm that human souls do not come into existence immediately at the beginning of the created world or to suggest that souls reside somewhere else during this interim period. One might think that common ancestry conflicts with this proposal. Hasker says this in regard to the conjunction of dualism and common ancestry, "Or should we, in the interest of preserving dualism, reject the evidence for common ancestry and insist on the special divine creation of at least the major types of living creatures? It does not speak well for a theory of mind if it requires us to reject such an impressive body of empirical evidence" in *Souls, Beastly, and Human*. 210-211. What is the creationist necessarily rejecting though? On a story like the one here, persons can affirm a common ancestry of physical stuff, but this does not necessitate that souls are produced by physical processes alone. This is begging the question.
31. If we assume that God creates, at minimum, one soul or a set of souls then Hasker's ESD would seem to be excluded because no soul is created directly and immediately. In fact, most theologians in the Christian tradition seem inclined toward the notion that God creates, at minimum, one soul.
32. Mendelson, Michael, "Saint Augustine", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/augustine/>>. See section 5 on Philosophical Anthropology. This or something like it could be a way of parsing out Augustine's fifth way. In Augustine's literature mid-way in his career, he rejects the notion of Origenistic pre-creation view of souls, but vacillates between creationism and traducianism. He also implies a view of origins that is somewhere in between these views. It is not without notions of teleology, emergentism, supervenience that come about later that we are able to make more sense of what Augustine was grasping to articulate. Mendelson's comment on this is helpful, "It is thus, again, not surprising that there is an unofficial fifth hypothesis that can be found elsewhere in Augustine's works. In *De Civitate Dei*, for example, Augustine suggests that God created only one soul, that of Adam, and subsequent human souls are not merely genealogical offshoots (as in traducianism) of that original soul, but they are actually identical to Adam's soul prior to assuming their own individual, particularized lives [*De Civitate Dei*, 13.14]. Not only does this avoid the mediation of the traducianist hypothesis, but it also manages to provide a theologically satisfying account of the universality of original sin without falling into the difficulties of God's placing an innocent soul into a sin-laden body, as would be the case in a general creationism. To what extent this constitutes a serious contender for Augustine's attention remains a matter of controversy [O'Connell 1987, esp. pp. 11–16; Rist 1989; Rist 1994, pp 121–9; Teske 1999 pg. 810]. As

noted earlier, when Augustine writes of the soul's origin in the *Retractationes* near the end of his life, he still asserts the obscurity and difficulty of the issue, and he is clearly reluctant to take a decisive stand on it. Although he sometimes downplays the seriousness of this uncertainty [e.g. *De Libero Arbitrio* III.21.59 and *De Genesi ad Litteram*, 10.20], there is no getting around the fact that it leaves a significant lacuna at the heart of his philosophical anthropology, one which leaves unanswered crucial questions about how we are to understand the embodied status of the human soul.”

33. The relationship between souls on traducianism and this variation of creationism would be different. On this variation of creationism, souls exist actually, yet not as individualized (potentially), as a part of a larger compound structure awaiting activation. Whereas on traducianism, souls only exist potentially in other individualized souls. See Oliver Crisp’s development of this theory in *Jonathan Edwards and the Metaphysics of Sin* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), see especially chapter 5.
34. An Origenistic view is either that the soul exists in a heavenly state of existence prior to the physical world or that it exists in eternity.
35. It is important to note that I did not say that souls are fitted for individual bodies, but for particular kinds of bodies (namely, human bodies). I am agnostic on whether or not individual bodies come to bear haecceity.
36. See William Hasker, *The Emergent Self*, 190.

Hence, there could be an excess of souls. Hasker is implicit about this problem on page 209 of “Souls, Beastly and Human.”